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1 Introduction
Trade liberalization is often met with sharp opposition. Recent examples in-
clude concern about a sharp increase in textile imports from China into the Eu-
ropean Unions (following the phasing out of the multi-fiber agreement (MFA)),
as well as complaints in France and other EU countries against the so-called
“Bolkestein” directive, which allows service providers from a given EU member
to temporarily work in another member country, under the regulatory regime
prevailing in the source country. Thus, a Polish plumber or hairdresser could
freely offer his services in France, while not being bound by French labor law
and other local regulations, provided his stay is short enough. One way to view
such a reform is that it simply widens the range of goods that are tradeable:
haircuts and plumbing services can now be purchased “in Poland”, with the
twist that the worker performing the service has to be moved to France, and
then back to Poland, which is a particular form of transportation cost.
While part of the complaints have to do with the fact that French labor
laws impose a tax on labor which is higher than in Poland, the bottomline is
that Polish wages are a third of French wages (they would thus remain much
lower even with similar labor market regulations), so that French plumbers
and hairdressers simply feel they are going to disappear. Similar concerns are
voiced about textile jobs disappearing because of Chinese imports, or offshoring
to India of services such as call centers or consumer banking.
Economists usually interpret resistance to such reforms through the lens of
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. It says that the return to the relatively scarce
factor is bound to fall when an economy opens to trade, so that if compensatory
transfers are not feasible, some social groups would oppose liberalization.
The problem with this view is that one then has to conceive of French hair-
dressers as part of a larger group, the “unskilled”, who, if scarce relative to the
East, suffer of any trade intensive in unskilled labor. Thus, there is no reason
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why French hairdressers should complain more about Polish hairdressers than
about, say, Polish textiles, or indeed about competitions from the millions of
unskilled unemployed in the French labor market. Furthermore, if there are
only a few skill categories, then trade in just that number of goods is enough to
bring about factor price equalization. Further increases in the range of trade-
able goods should not have any additional harmful effects on the scarce factor,
while it can bring beneficial effects if there are increasing returns to scale1.
One way to solve this paradox is to think about resistance to reform in terms
of a segmented labor market where moving between occupations is costly. If la-
bor markets were perfect, any adverse effect of liberalization in haircuts would
be diluted in the form of a lower unskilled wage in the economy, and would not
be particularly concentrated on hairdressers. However, if labor markets are seg-
mented, in that moving to an occupation is difficult (at least in the short run),
then each occupation becomes a different kind of labor input, and it is conceiv-
able that liberalizing trade in haircuts would have large adverse effects on French
hairdressers, who are prevented from relocating to other occupations. These, in
turn, are sheltered from the downward pressure on unskilled wages exerted by
the reform. Thus, labor rigidities concentrate losses upon the occupations that
are liberalized.
One may add that regulatory entry barriers play an important role in gener-
ating labor market segmentation. These barriers are well documented. For the
French case, for example, a number of them are reported by Cahuc and Kramarz
(2004). For example, a lot of professions (hairdressers, butchers, veterinaries...)
cannot be entered without a specific degree, which often involves academic skills
not needed to perform the task. Clearly, such requirements make it very diffi-
cult to enter these professions at a late date in one’s life cycle. Other types of
barriers to professional mobility include entry quotas and exclusive territories,
that are prevalent for taxis and pharmacies.
1Such effects, well understood since Helpman and Krugman (1985), are left out of our
analysis here.
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If such barriers did not exist, the professions that are threatened by the
Bolkestein directive would have already suffered much more from competition
from the unemployed. In a country such as the UK, these barriers are much
lower, and, accordingly, opposition to the directive is much smaller: because of
labor mobility, existing trade in commodities already largely determines factor
prices, and one might not expect much action on the inequality front when
further liberalization takes place.
This paper analyzes the distributional effects of trade reforms when labor
markets are segmented. It uses a Ricardian model in the fashion of Dornbusch-
Fischer-Samuelson (1977, hereafter DFS). There are two countries, East and
West, and the key assumptions being made are:
-Goods can be ranked by level of sophistication; the relative productivity
of the East is lower in more sophisticated products. Thus the West has a
comparative advantage in these products.
-Goods below a certain level of sophistication are non traded; this captures
the fact that greater sophistication is associated with industrial products, while
lower sophistication is associated with services.
-Trade reform consists in broadening the range of goods that are tradeable.
This stands in contrast to most of the literature, which typically considers a
uniform reduction in tariff levels.2 It is meant to capture reforms like the dis-
puted service directive mentioned above, which increases the range of tradeable
goods.3
-Trade reform will therefore reduce the critical sophistication level which
separates tradables from non tradables. Thus, the new tradables are less sophis-
ticated than the existing ones; at the margin, they should be produced by the
East.
-Workers have to choose which sector to work in before trade liberaliza-
2Here we have, in some sense, an extreme case of a non-uniform reduction in tariffs, since
tariffs fall from infinity to zero for the newly traded goods, and are unchanged for other goods.
3The phasing out of the MFA is a more mixed kind of policy, since a subset of goods is
made ”more” tradeable.
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tion takes place. Therefore, if haircuts are made tradeable, French hairdressers
cannot move to another sector. They have to continue producing haircuts. In
equilibrium, the international price of haircut and their wage have to fall so as
to maintain full employment in that sector.
Because of imperfect labor mobility, one has to distinguish between two
types of reforms: an ex-ante liberalization is announced prior to the individual’s
occupational choice. An ex-post liberalization takes place after this choice,
which therefore has taken place on the basis of a less liberal expected trade
regimes.
These assumptions allow us to derive a number of interesting results regard-
ing the effects of trade reform. We first find that the effect of liberalization on
the terms of trade tend to favor the East. Second, under ex-post liberalization,
there indeed exists a class of workers in the West who are harmed because they
face competition from Eastern workers and cannot relocate to other activities.
But we argue that if the East’s economy is relatively small, their wage losses are
not very large. Things are different, however, if there exist asymmetries in labor
market institutions, such that upon reform, labor can relocate in the East but
not in the West. Some workers in the West can then experience very large wage
losses, more or less equal to the average wage gap between the two countries.
Furthermore, the country as a whole may have net losses, which is implausible
under ex-ante liberalization and, as I show, impossible under ex-post liberaliza-
tion when labor is immobile in both countries. In such a case producers of non
traded goods lose as well.
Thus, rigid labor markets in the West magnify opposition to reform there,
and the worst case for the West is when the East is not rigid.4 The model is
also used to derive interesting predictions about the distribution of gains and
losses in the East.
4 In the case of offshoring to India from the US, one is in the configuration where labor
markets are more regulated in the East than in the West. The model can easily be used to
deal with this case, and we expect the phenomenon to be supported in the West because of
gains from trade.
5
2 What does the literature say?
In this section, I discuss how this paper is connected to the existing literature on
the effects of trade liberalization. Clearly, the literature has already analyzed the
positive and normative implications of imperfect labor mobility, and this paper
shares with it the basic insight that factors in import-competing sectors lose
more if they cannot relocate. Its contribution is four-fold: (i) the use of the DFS
model with a continuum of goods, in conjunction with segmented labor markets
to analyze the impact of liberalization; (ii) considering an extension of the range
of goods that are tradeable rather than a reduction in tariffs, which matches
some real-world policy reforms and is much more tractable under the DFS model
than under models with a finite, discrete number of goods; (iii) focusing on
the case where liberalization takes place at the margin of the tradeable good
where one country has the biggest comparative advantage — although the model
could easily be used to study alternative configurations; and (iv) analyzing the
implications of differential labor market institutions across blocks.
The modelling apparatus used here is based on Dornbusch et al. (1977).
These authors do not consider labor market segmentation, and do not perform
a detailed analysis of gains from trade in utility terms, limiting themselves to
relative wages. They consider the role of uniform tariffs, which endogenously
generate a band of non-traded goods around the critical one where comparative
advantage is the same across countries. DFS find effects of liberalization on the
terms of trade that are quite different from the ones studied here, and because
of their assumption of perfect labor mobility, gains (or losses) are uniformly
distributed within a country.
Leamer (1980), dealing with a variety of models, considers a timing similar
to mine, i.e. a first period with mobile factors and a second period with costly
mobility.5 As in the present paper, excessively fast liberalization may (absent
compensatory transfers) harm workers in “exposed” industries, who must either
5Grossman (1983), analyzes the consequences of imperfect capital mobility.
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pay the adjustment costs or suffer a real wage loss. This defines a maximum
pace of liberalization if one wants to buy the support of these workers. The
analysis is carried in the context of a small open economy, so that there are
aggregate gains from trade even though factor mobility is costly. However,
Leamer also considers the impact of expected liberalization in period II on
occupational choice in period I. In this second best world where tariffs in period
I are exogenously given, less than full liberalization may then be optimal if that
impact is taken into account, even if distributional issues are absent.6
Building on this work, Feenstra and Lewis (1994) consider how Pareto gains
from trade can be implemented when labor is imperfectly mobile. They show
that the traditional Dixit-Norman (1980) scheme of commodity taxation must
be supplemented with “adjustment assistance”, i.e. a subsidy for labor to move.7
Relative to this work, I do not consider the role of adjustment assistance. In-
stead, distributive consequences among various categories of workers, depending
on their initial occupation, are analyzed in a richer fashion, as are terms-of-trade
effects, that are absent in these papers’ small open economy approach.
Furusawa and Lai (1999) also consider optimal tariff reduction when labor
reallocation between sectors is costly. There are only two traded goods, an im-
portable and an exportable, a non traded (numéraire good), and two skill levels.
The unskilled can only work in importables or in the numéraire. Following a fall
in tariffs, they must reallocate from the importables to the numéraire. If labor
reallocation is costly, then optimal liberalization is gradual when these costs
are convex but not when they are linear; gradualism may prevail in that case
too, however, if there are commitment problems for each country to enforce the
6The linkage between expectations of future policies and current determination of a state
variable by private agents makes this problem similar to a credibility problem à la Kydland-
Prescott (1977) and Barro-Gordon (1982). For an application to excess protection under
imperfect labor mobility, see Staiger and Tabellini (1987).
7Adjustment assistance is also justified under rigidities different from costly mobility.
Brecher and Chroudri (1994), for example, consider the case of involuntary unemployment
generated by efficiency wages. Brander and Spencer (1994) analyze the distortionary effects
of adjustement assistance, arguing that Pareto gains from trade may be infeasible if such
distortions are large.
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agreement. These authors do not consider intra-country distributional issues,
or asymmetries in labor market institutions. On the other hand, their model
allows them to deal with dynamic game-theoretic aspects of liberalization in a
tractable way.
While we do not consider optimal liberalization here, note that partial reform
may be of lower value when dealing with the range of goods that are tradeable
rather than with a uniform tariff level on all tradeables (or importables). As we
show below, producers of the newly traded goods in the West lose from liberal-
ization but producers of existing traded goods gain. Therefore, hairdressers lose
less if a broad range of goods are liberalized than if just haircuts are liberalized.
That stands in contrast to the literature just reviewed.
Another strand of literature asks whether trade liberalization may be harm-
ful to one country, by relying on its effects on technology, rather than labor
segmentation. For example, Samuelson (2004) argues that if the South becomes
more productive in goods where the North has a comparative advantage, then
the North is hurt as its terms-of-trade deteriorate.8 In the present model, a
similar terms-of-trade effect arises, and we can show that the West may be
harmed by liberalization even under perfect labor mobility. That is however for
a different reason, namely that the East has a greater comparative advantage
in newly traded goods than in existing traded goods. The effect emphasized by
Samuelson arises, in some sense, endogenously, in that the East stops producing
goods where it had a marginal comparative advantage. As these goods are now
produced by the West, East’s productivity in the goods exported by the West
goes up on average, because of a composition effect: East is more productive in
goods newly produced by the West than in its previous exports.
8See also Bhagwati et al. (2004) for a response.
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3 Model
There is a continuum of goods, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. There are two countries,
West and East. Variables pertaining to the East country are denoted by a star.
Labor is the only factor of production. In the West, the production function for
good i is y(i) = l(i), where l(i) is the amount of labor used to produce y(i) units
of good i. In the East, the production function is y∗(i) = l∗(i)/a(i), where a(i)
is a non-decreasing, differentiable function of i.We will concentrate on the case
where a(i) ≥ 1. Hence the West is more productive than the East, and more so,
the higher the index i. One interpretation is that the East is less technologically
advanced and that goods with a higher index i are more “sophisticated”. But
it is just an interpretation and no result hinges on the absolute value of a(.).
Consumers in each country derive the following utility from consumption:
U =
Z 1
0
ln c(i)di,
where c(i) is consumption of good i. Accordingly, demand for good i is given by
R/p(i), where p(i) is the price of the good and R is the consumer’s income.
We assume that there exists iT such that a good i is traded if and only if
i ≥ iT . Thus, more sophisticated goods are more likely to be traded. This can
be interpreted as reflecting the greater tradeability of manufactures relative to
services.
Consequently, demand for good i is
-Y/p(i) in the West and Y ∗/p(i)∗ in the East if the good is non traded. Here,
Y (resp. Y ∗) is the West’s (resp. East’s) GNP level, and p(i) (resp. p∗(i)) is
the price of good i in the West (resp. East).
-(Y + Y ∗)/p(i) if the good is traded, where p(i) = p∗(i) is now the interna-
tional price of good i.
The labor market operates in two stages. In the first stage, people have to
decide which sector they will work in, i.e. which good they will produce. They
base their decision on their expectations for the value of iT that will prevail. In
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the second stage, labor supply committed to each good, and the labor market
clears for each of these segments, yielding an equilibrium wage w(i) in the West
and w∗(i) in the East for each segment.
4 Ex-post equilibrium
It is easy to compute the equilibrium once labor supply is frozen for each good.
In the West, the supply of labor in sector i is equal to l(i). In the East, it is
equal to l∗(i). Competition between firms implies that p(i) = w(i) in the West,
and p∗(i) = w∗(i)a(i) in the East. Full employment of labor implies an inelastic
supply of good i equal to y(i) = l(i) in the West and y∗(i) = l∗(i)/a(i) in the
East. Therefore, the sector-specific wage in the West is equal to
w(i) = p(i) =
Y
l(i)
if i < iT ;
w(i) = p(i) =
Y + Y ∗
l(i) + l∗(i)/a(i)
if i ≥ iT . (1)
Similarly, in the East,
w∗(i) =
p∗(i)
a(i)
=
Y ∗
l∗(i)
if i < iT ;
w∗(i) =
p(i)
a(i)
=
Y + Y ∗
a(i)l(i) + l∗(i)
if i ≥ iT . (2)
To close the model, one needs to compute the GNP (=GDP) levels Y and
Y ∗. One has to choose a price normalization, which gives one degree of freedom.
We normalize Western GDP to 1. Thus Y = 1. To compute Y ∗, just add all
incomes in, say, the West to define its GDP:
Y = 1 =
Z iT
0
Y/l(i).l(i)di+
Z 1
iT
Y + Y ∗
l(i) + l∗(i)/a(i)
l(i)di,
or equivalently
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Y ∗ =
R 1
iT
l∗(i)
a(i)l(i)+l∗(i)diR 1
iT
l(i)
l(i)+l∗(i)/a(i)di
. (3)
The preceding formulas characterize the ex-post equilibrium conditional on
the sector-specific labor supplies l(i) and l∗(i), irrespective of whether these
supplies were determined on the basis of the actual realization of iT vs. some
other expected value.
5 Ex-ante equilibrium
Let us now characterize the equilibrium allocation of labor when the actual level
of trade iT is equal to the expected one. The total workforce is equal to L in
the West and L∗ in the East. In the first period, workers freely choose which
sectors to work in. It follows that, in each country, the wage must be the same
for all sectors with a positive labor force. Furthermore, in the other sectors,
a firm employing some workers at that wage should not be able to make any
profits. If its profits were strictly negative, then the good can only be produced
in the other country.
Consequently, in all non traded sectors, the wage must be the same. Using
the normalization Y = 1 and the demand curves defined in section 3, we get
that
w(i) = w =
1
l¯
, i < iT ; (4)
w∗(i) = w∗ =
Y ∗
l¯∗
, i < iT . (5)
In these formulas, l¯ is the (endogenous) common employment level for all
the non traded sectors, and l¯∗ is its counterpart in the East. Turning now to
the traded goods sectors, we see that there are three possibilities:
A. The good will only be produced in the West. In this case one must have
l(i) > 0 and w(i) = w = p(i), implying, using (4) and (1), that l(i) = l¯(1+Y ∗).
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This defines the employment level common to all traded goods only produced in
the West. Furthermore, the price of these goods cannot exceed its unit cost in
the East, implying w ≤ a(i)w∗. Thus there exists a critical level of sophistication
iC such that
a(iC) = w/w
∗. (6)
All goods such that i > iC are entirely produced in the West.
B. The good will only be produced in the East. Here we get l(i) = 0,
w∗(i) = w∗, so that, given (2), l∗(i) = (1 + Y ∗)/w∗ = l¯∗(1 + Y ∗)/Y ∗. Goods
such that i < iC can only be produced in the East.
C. Therefore, only the critical good iC can be produced in both countries,
which defines a set of measure zero.
To close the model, we have to compute the employment levels in non-traded
goods l¯ and l¯∗ and the GDP level in the East Y ∗. Equality of supply and demand
in the labor market for each country allows to easily compute l¯ and l¯∗ :
l¯iT + l¯(1 + Y
∗)(1− iC) = L; (7)
l¯∗iT + l¯
∗ 1 + Y
∗
Y ∗
(iC − iT ) = L∗. (8)
Finally, equation (3) implies
Y ∗ =
iC − iT
1− iC
. (9)
Substituting into (7) and (8) we get
l¯ = L; l¯∗ = L∗.
Therefore,
w =
1
L
; (10)
w∗ =
iC − iT
(1− iC)L∗
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Using these along with (4)-(5) into (6), we get a formula determining iC :
a(iC) =
L∗(1− iC)
L(iC − iT )
. (11)
6 Ex-ante trade liberalization
It is instructive to check whether both countries gain from trade liberalization
if it is announced ex-ante, that is when people can adjust their occupational
choice—or, equivalently, when labor markets are not segmented. Standard small
open economy results do not apply and in principle one of the two countries
may lose because of terms-of-trade effects.
In this model, trade liberalization is a reduction in iT , i.e. a widening of the
range of goods that can be traded. An important aspect, which is clearly due to
our assumptions, is that the West has a comparative disadvantage in the new
traded goods. The opposite would be true if we had assumed that the traded
goods were at the bottom, instead of the top, of the sophistication ranking.
(One could also consider the case of an interior interval of traded-goods, which
would generate two potential reforms: one where the new traded goods are less
sophisticated, and another were they are more sophisticated.)
Under such an “ex-ante” liberalization, one just has to apply the preceding
analysis and compute the derivative of utility with respect to iT .
In the West, the nominal wage rate is independent of iT . The change in
welfare is just the opposite of the change in the consumer price index. The
internal price of all goods produced by the West is p(i) = w = 1/L. The price
of an imported good is p(i) = a(i)w∗ = a(i)w/a(iC) =
a(i)
La(iC)
. The consumer
price index p is therefore given by
ln p =
µ
ln
1
L
¶
(iT + 1− iC) +
Z iC
iT
ln
a(i)
La(iC)
di
= ln
1
L
+
Z iC
iT
ln
a(i)
a(iC)
di. (12)
This formula implies that any dose of free trade is preferable to full autarky,
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i.e. to iT = iC = 1, since in that case one has ln p = ln 1L > ln
1
L+
R iC
iT
ln a(i)a(iC)di.
However, that does not tell us whether the West gains from liberalization once
some trade exists.
Differentiating (12) with respect to iT , we get
d ln p
diT
= − ln a(iT )
a(iC)
− a
0(iC)
a(iC)
(iC − iT )
diC
diT
(13)
Differentiating (11) we get
diC
diT
=
1
(iC − iT )a
0(iC)
a(iC)
+ 1−iT1−iC
> 0. (14)
Not surprisingly, trade liberalization implies a fall in iC ; while producers of
the new traded goods in the West must relocate to another activity, as the West
has no comparative advantage in these goods, the West takes over the most so-
phisticated goods produced by the East, triggering a similar labor displacement
there.
Substituting (14) into (13), we get
d ln p
diT
= − ln a(iT )
a(iC)
−
a0(iC)
a(iC)
(iC − iT )
(iC − iT )a
0(iC)
a(iC)
+ 1−iT1−iC
≶ 0. (15)
This expression is not necessarily positive: the West may lose from liber-
alization. While it imports new goods that are more efficiently imported than
produced at home (the first term), the East is more productive in the newly
traded goods than in the other traded goods; this pushes up its wage and the
terms of trade improve in its favor9. Consequently, the existing set of imported
goods is more expensive, which harms the West. That effect is captured by the
second term in (15). In principle, if a
0(iC)
a(iC)
is large enough, this term may dom-
inate and the West may lose on net. However, that does not seem very likely,
9Similar effects arise in Itoh and Kiyono (1987).
14
since a first order approximation — which is more accurate, the more linear is
the ln a() function — yields
− ln a(iT )
a(iC)
≈ a
0(iC)
a(iC)
(iC − iT ) >
a0(iC)
a(iC)
(iC − iT )
(iC − iT )a
0(iC)
a(iC)
+ 1−iT1−iC
.
Furthermore, the reason why the West may lose, i.e. that its imports get more
expensive, is quite remote from the usual complaints about liberalization dis-
placing jobs.10
As far as the East is concerned, the terms of trade effect goes in the same
direction as the direct effect: The East unambiguously gains from reform. To
check that, note that the price of good i in the East is p∗(i) = a(i)w∗ =
a(i)/(La(iC)) for i < iC , and p∗(i) = p(i) = w = 1/L for i > iC . Therefore, the
price level in the East is
ln p∗ =
Z iC
0
ln(a(i)w∗)di+ (1− iC) ln(
1
L
).
The real consumption wage is therefore equal to
lnw∗ − ln p∗ = (1− iC)(lnw∗ − ln
1
L
)−
Z iC
0
ln(a(i))di
= −(1− iC)(ln a(iC))−
Z iC
0
ln(a(i))di,
where (6) and (10) have been used.
Differentiating, we see that
d(lnw∗ − ln p∗)
diT
=
diC
diT
×
µ
−(1− iC)
a0(iC)
a(iC)
¶
< 0.
Thus the East unambiguously gains from a reduction in iT .
This section’s findings are summarized in the following proposition.
10DFS (1977) consider a rather different setting, where there are uniform tariffs across
goods. This yields a range of non traded goods centered around the critical one y∗,rather
than at the extreme of the distribution of comparative advantage as studied here. As a result,
the terms-of-trade effects that they obtain are quite different, and nil if countries are of equal
size—in this latter case the usual gains-from-trade result applies.
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PROPOSITION 1 — If liberalization is anticipated and/or there is free mo-
bility between sectors, then upon liberalization
(i) GDP goes up in the East relative to the West;
(ii) all workers in the East gain;
(iii) workers in the West may either gain or lose, due to a deterioration in
the terms of trade;
(iv) the West gains if the curvature of the ln a() function is not too strong.
7 Ex-post trade liberalization
I now analyze the impact of trade liberalization, under segmented labor markets,
when it has not been expected by the agents when making their occupational
choice. I assume that l(i) and l∗(i) are consistent with an ex-ante equilibrium
for a trade level equal to iT , but that the actual level that prevails is ı˜T <
iT . Therefore l(i) and l∗(i) are determined as in Section 5, while remaining
variables are determined as in Section 4, with iT replaced by ı˜T . At the time of
liberalization, the economy starts in a situation where the allocation of labor is
as follows:
1. l(i) = L, l∗(i) = L∗ for i < iT .
2. l(i) = 1−iT1−iCL, l
∗(i) = 0, for i > iC
3. l(i) = 0, l∗(i) = 1−iTiC−iT L
∗, for iT < i < iC .
Here, iC denotes the critical value of i that prevails if liberalization does
not take place, i.e. the solution to (11).
To compute how trade liberalization affects wages, we just have to mechan-
ically apply the results of Section 4. Normalizing the West’s GDP to 1 and
denoting by Y˜ the East’s GDP under liberalization, we get that
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w˜(i) =
1
L
, i < ı˜T ;
w˜(i) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
L+ L∗/a(i)
, ı˜T < i < iT
w˜(i) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
L
1− iC
1− iT
, i > iC . (16)
Similarly, for the East we have
w˜∗(i) =
Y˜ ∗
L∗
, i < ı˜T ;
w˜∗(i) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
a(i)L+ L∗
, ı˜T < i < iT
w˜∗(i) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
L∗
iC − iT
1− iT
, iC < i < iT .
Finally, equation (3) allows to compute the East’s GDP:
Y˜ ∗ =
iC − ı˜T − L
R iT
ı˜T
1
L+L∗/a(i)di
1− iC + L
R iT
ı˜T
1
L+L∗/a(i)di
(17)
These formulas allow to compute the distributive effects of liberalization. To
do so, we must distinguish between six groups of people:
DEFINITION 1 — A worker in the West (resp. the East) belongs to
-group A (resp. group A*) if he works in sector i such that i ≥ iC (resp.
iT ≤ i ≤ iC);
-group B (resp. group B*) if ı˜T ≤ i < iT ;
-group C (resp. group C*) if i < ı˜T .
Thus, A refers to producers of goods that were traded absent liberalization,
B to workers who produce the newly traded goods, and C to the goods that
remain non traded.
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7.1 Distributive impact of a marginal liberalization
The effects of liberalization may differ between workers, because labor cannot
relocate upon liberalization. To simplify the analysis, I now confine myself
to the case of a marginal liberalization, i.e. ı˜T = iT + dı˜T , where dı˜T < 0 is
infinitesimal. In the next subsection, I establish some results about nonmarginal
liberalizations.
A first point to be noted is that, as in the case of ex-ante liberalization,
the East enjoys an improvement in its terms of trade. This is again because its
relative productivity is higher in the new traded goods, compared to the existing
ones. This improvement in the terms of trade is associated with an increase in
its relative GDP Y ∗. To see this, just differentiate (17) with respect to ı˜T at
ı˜T = iT , making use of (11). We get
dY˜ ∗
dı˜T
=
L∗
(1− iC)(La(iT ) + L∗)
(
a(iT )
a(iC)
− 1) < 0. (18)
Thus, a fall in iT unambiguously raises nominal (=relative) GDP in the
East. From there it is straightforward to use (16) and compute the effects of
liberalization on relative wages in the West. Group C’s wage remains constant
in nominal terms. They will be used as our benchmark group. Because Y˜ ∗ goes
up, the wage of group A’s workers goes up in nominal terms. Therefore, they
get better-off relative to group C. Because they export to the East, they benefit
from its relative growth, which raises demand for these goods and thus their
equilibrium wage. Finally, producers of the newly traded goods in the West
(group B) unambiguously lose in terms of wages. Their nominal wage falls from
1/L to
w˜(iT ) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
L+ L∗/a(iT )
≈ 1 + Y
∗
L+ L∗/a(iT )
=
a(iT )
La(iC)
a(iC)L+ L
∗
a(iT )L+ L∗
< 1/L. (19)
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This wage loss is discrete, while the gains to other workers are infinitesimal (but
the mass of workers who suffer that loss is infinitesimal). Therefore, given that
the aggregate price level moves infinitesimally, group B loses not only relative
to others but also in absolute terms.
The model is useful to perform back-of-the envelope calculations on the
effects of trade liberalization on group B. Let us use the European case as a
benchmark for our orders of magnitude. Suppose that the East’s workforce is
about 20 % of that of the West, and that wages there are about one third of
the West’s. According to (6) one must then have a(iC) = 3; Eastern workers
must be at least three times less productive than Western ones, in all goods
exported by the West. Assume, to pick up the worst possible case, that the
Polish “hairdressers”, i.e. Eastern producers of the newly traded goods, have a
productivity almost equal to Western ones, that is, a(iT ) ≈ 1. Let us normalize
L to 1, implying L∗ = 0.2. Then group B’s wage absent liberalization is w(iT ) =
1/L = 1. Their new wage is
w˜(iT ) =
a(iT )
La(iC)
a(iC)L+ L
∗
a(iT )L+ L∗
=
1
3
× 3.2
1.2
= 0.89
Thus liberalization of trade entails a wage loss of 11 % for group B. That
is by no means negligible, but not large. It is certainly much below the average
level of payroll taxes in Europe, and one can think of many less controversial
policy shifts that generate similar or larger losses for specific groups.
To compute the absolute gains to the two other groups of workers, we need
to know how the price level in the West evolves. It is given by
ln p˜ =
Z iT
0
ln w˜(i)di+
Z iC
iT
ln(a(i)w˜∗(i))di+
Z 1
iC
ln w˜(i)di
=
Z ı˜T
0
ln
1
L
+
Z iT
ı˜T
ln
1 + Y˜ ∗
L+ L∗/a(i)
di
+
Z iC
iT
ln
⎛
⎝
³
1 + Y˜ ∗
´
a(i)
L∗
iC − iT
1− iT
⎞
⎠ di+
Z 1
iC
ln
Ã
1 + Y˜ ∗
L
1− iC
1− iT
!
di.
We can use that formula to compute the effect of a marginal liberalization
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from iT to ı˜T = iT + dı˜T < iT :
d ln p˜ = (1− iT )
dY˜ ∗
1 + Y ∗
− dı˜T (ln
1 + Y ∗
L+ L∗/a(iT )
− ln 1
L
) (20)
As in the case of ex-ante liberalization, there is an efficiency effect and a
terms of trade effect. The terms of trade effect is the first term, which repre-
sents the increment in the price level due to wage increases in the East. These
increases also push up wages for producers of traded goods in the West, who are
sheltered from competition from other workers. This effect is also reflected in
that term, which is multiplicative in (1− iT ), the total mass of traded goods11 .
The efficiency effect is the last term, which is equal to the range of liberalization
−dı˜T times the price fall in the newly traded goods; this price fall is exactly
equal to the wage loss of the corresponding workers: thus the more group B
suffers from liberalization, the greater the efficiency gains from it.
If d ln p˜/dı˜T > 0, then the West gains as a whole (since its nominal GDP is
pinned down to 1), and group C also gains (since their wage is pinned down to
1/L). Rearranging (20) by making use of (18),(11), and (9), we get that:
d ln p˜
dı˜T
=
µ
zC
zT
− 1
¶
− ln zC
zT
,
where zC = L+ L
∗
a(iC)
< zT = L+
L∗
a(iT )
.
Because x − 1 − lnx ≥ 0 for all x, this expression is always positive. Thus
there are always net gains from trade liberalization to the West in this case.
That is paradoxical, because one could not show such a result in the case of
ex-ante liberalization. Thus, labor immobility makes trade reform profitable for
the country as a whole, while it might harm it if labor were mobile. The reason
is that under ex-ante liberalization, wages in the East increase by more because
labor relocates efficiently to the newly traded goods. Such reallocation is not
11The terms of trade effect in the case of ex-ante liberalization is only multiplicative in
(iC − iT ), the mass of imported goods.
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possible under ex-post liberalization. 12 .
Since group A gains more than group C, it also gains.
To summarize:
PROPOSITION 2 — Consider an infinitesimal, unexpected drop of the trade
margin iT . Then its effect on workers in the West is as follows:
(i) Group B unambiguously loses, by a discrete amount.
(ii) Group A always gains.
(iii) Group C has a net positive gain which is always lower than that of group
A.
(iv) The country as a whole unambiguously gains.
Let us now turn to gainers and losers in the East. Again, we first look at
nominal wages, which also gives us the distribution of income, and then compute
the change in the nominal price level. We again have three groups: Producers
of the existing traded goods (group A*), have a wage change equal to
d ln w˜∗(i) =
dY˜ ∗
1 + Y ∗
.
Producers of the newly traded goods (group B*) experience a discrete jump
in wages:
∆ ln w˜∗(i) = ln
1 + Y ∗
a(iT )L+ L∗
− ln Y
∗
L∗
= ln
a(iC)L+ L
∗
a(iT )L+ L∗
> 0.
Because this wage jump is discrete, and because the price level moves only
infinitesimally, these gains are real as well as nominal. We can perform similar
back-of-the-envelope calculations as for group B. With a(iC) = 3, a(iT ) = 1, L =
1, L∗ = 0.2, we get a(iC)L+L
∗
a(iT )L+L∗
= 3.21.2 = 2. 67. The wages of Eastern hairdressers
12That does not mean that net gains from trade are always larger when labor is immobile.
The only thing we know is that they cannot be negative, while this possibility cannot be ruled
out under ex-ante liberalization. It is difficult to say more. Even with a simple formulation
like a(i) = exp(αi), it is difficult to compare the two formulas.
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increase by a lot, since they have to converge to those of Western ones who
are just as productive. As the Eastern workforce is just 20 % of the Western
one, most of the adjustment is in the form of a large increase in the Eastern
hairdressers wage, with a moderate fall in the Western hairdressers wage.
Turning now to group C*, the producers of non traded goods, their nominal
wage change is
d ln w˜∗(i) =
dY˜ ∗
Y ∗
.
Their proportional (and therefore absolute, as ex-ante wages are the same)
wage gain is therefore larger than that of group A*. They benefit more from the
(relative) increase in demand brought about by the East’s improvement in the
terms of trade, because they serve only the Eastern market.
Therefore, those who gain the least are group A*, and group B* gains the
most.
We can now compute the change in the price level and the real gains for
groups A* and C*. The consumer price level in the East is given by
ln p˜∗ =
Z iC
0
ln(a(i)w˜∗(i))di+
Z 1
iC
ln(w˜(i))di
=
Z ı˜T
0
ln a(i)di+ ı˜T ln
Y˜ ∗
L∗
+
Z iT
ı˜T
ln
1 + Y˜ ∗
L+ L∗/a(i)
di
+
Z iC
iT
ln a(i)di+ (iC − iT ) ln
³
1 + Y˜ ∗
´
(iC − iT )
L∗(1− iT )
+(1− iC) ln
³
1 + Y˜ ∗
´
(1− iC)
L(1− iT )
.
Considering again a marginal liberalization, we get
d ln p˜∗
dı˜T
(˜ıT = iT ) = ln
a(iT )Y
∗
L∗
− ln 1 + Y
∗
L+ L∗/a(iT )
+
dY ∗
dı˜T
∙
iT
Y ∗
+
1− iT
1 + Y ∗
¸
= ln
La(iT ) + L
∗
La(iC) + L∗
+
dY ∗
dı˜T
∙
iT
Y ∗
+
1− iT
1 + Y ∗
¸
< 0,
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where (9) and (11) have been used.
In nominal terms, the price level unambiguously goes up upon reform. What
happens to the living standards of groups A* and C*? A* clearly loses, since
for this group we have
d ln w˜∗(i)
dı˜T
=
dY ∗
dı˜T
1
1 + Y ∗
>
d ln p˜∗
dı˜T
.
Their wage increases as much as the price of the existing traded goods, and
less than the price of the newly traded goods and the non-traded goods. Thus
they unambiguously lose from the reform. Haircuts and taxi fares have become
more expensive, and it is too late for them to become a hairdresser or a taxi
driver.
Turning now to group C*, intuitively, it should gain: its nominal wage is
proportional to nominal GDP; therefore it gains if and only if the country as a
whole gains, which should be true, as its terms of trade improve. We can check
that by computing the change in ln w˜∗(i)/p˜∗ for these workers, using (9), (11)
and (18):
d ln w˜∗(i)
dı˜T
− d ln p˜
∗
dı˜T
= − ln La(iT ) + L
∗
La(iC) + L∗
+ (1− iT )
dY ∗
dı˜T
∙
1
Y ∗
− 1
1 + Y ∗
¸
= − ln La(iT ) + L
∗
La(iC) + L∗
+
L(a(iT )− a(iC))
La(iT ) + L∗
< 0 (21)
This expression is negative because it is equal to ln zˆCzˆT + 1 −
zˆC
zˆT
for zˆC =
La(iC)+L
∗ and zˆT = La(iT )+L∗. Thus reform unambiguously increases these
workers’ living standards.
To summarize:
PROPOSITION 3 — Consider an infinitesimal, unexpected drop in the trade
margin iT . Then its effect on workers in the East is as follows:
(i) Group B* unambiguously gains, by a discrete amount.
(ii) Group A* always loses.
(iii) Group C* has a net positive gain.
(iv) The country as a whole unambiguously gains.
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7.2 Nonmarginal liberalization
In the Appendix, I establish some results for a non marginal liberalization,
limiting the analysis to the welfare of producers of newly traded goods in the
West. They are summarized by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4 — Consider a discrete, non anticipated fall of the trade
margin from iT to ı˜T . Then in the West:
(i) For i > ı˜T and i− ı˜T small enough, workers in sector i unambiguously
lose.
(ii) Further liberalizations increase the welfare of producers of traded goods:
∀i > ı˜T , d ln(w(i)/p)dı˜T < 0
(iii) Exposed workers with a sufficient comparative advantage, i.e. such that
(33) holds, may enjoy absolute gains from the reform.
8 Asymmetric labor market institutions
There are good reasons why it is costly to relocate from one activity to an-
other: locating a suitable job opportunity, retraining, moving, etc.; however, in
a number of countries, these barriers are regulatory rather than genuine: degree
requirements, licences, numerus clausus, etc. Thus it is conceivable that one
country has different mobility costs from the other. In this section, we consider
what happens when labor in the East can freely relocate upon reform, while
workers in the West are stuck in the industry they have chosen.
It is easy to see that in such a case, wages for producers of the newly traded
goods in the West are going to fall by much more than in the previous section:
in the East, as much labor as necessary will flow into these sectors so as to
equate wages to those of the economy as a whole.
Let us characterize the effects of ex-post liberalization in this case.
It is more convenient now to start the analysis with the East. In that country,
there is now a single wage w˜∗. Denoting by l˜∗ the new common employment
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level in non traded industries, and Y˜ ∗ the new GDP level, we have w˜∗ = Y˜ ∗/l˜∗.
In the newly traded goods (i ∈ [˜ıT , iT ]) the employment level l˜∗(i) adjusts to
equate the wage in that sector to the economy’s wage, implying that
1 + Y˜ ∗
a(i)L+ l˜∗(i)
= w˜∗ =
Y˜ ∗
l˜∗
, (22)
where the West’s GDP is again normalized to one.
Equation (22) determines the employment level in the newly traded goods
as a function of Y˜ ∗ and l˜∗ :
l˜∗(i) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
Y˜ ∗
l˜∗ − a(i)L.
For the existing traded goods that were produced in the East, in equilibrium
it must continue to produce all of them, as no Western workers can move to
those sectors. Employment adjusts again to equate wages to the economy-wide
level:
1 + Y˜ ∗
l˜∗(i)
= w˜∗ =
Y˜ ∗
l˜∗
, (23)
so that we have
l˜∗(i) = l˜∗
1 + Y˜ ∗
Y˜ ∗
.
Finally, Eastern workers may also in principle produce the goods that were
exported by the West (i > iC). However, that is unlikely to be an equilibrium
outcome, as its terms of trade are likely to improve, making it more expensive at
the margin for the East to produce these goods: If labor were perfectly mobile
in the West as well, we know that iC would fall, not rise. Hence we look for an
equilibrium such that the East does not produce these goods. The wage earned
by Western workers producing these goods is
w˜(i) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
l(i)
=
1 + Y˜ ∗
L(1− iT )
(1− iC). (24)
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It is also equal to the good’s international price p(i).
Using these derivations, labor market equilibrium in the East implies that
L∗ = ı˜T l˜
∗ + (iC − ıT )l˜∗
1 + Y˜ ∗
Y˜ ∗
+
Z iT
ı˜T
Ã
1 + Y˜ ∗
Y˜ ∗
l˜∗ − a(i)L
!
di,
which is equivalent to
l˜∗ =
L∗ + L
R iT
ı˜T
a(i)di
ı˜T +
1+Y˜ ∗
Y˜ ∗
(iC − ı˜T )
. (25)
Finally, we can again compute Y˜ ∗ by summing all incomes in the West:
Y˜ = 1 =
Z ı˜T
0
1/L.Ldi+
Z iT
ı˜T
a(i)
Y˜ ∗
l˜∗
Ldi+
Z 1
iC
1 + Y˜ ∗
L(1− iT )/(1− iC)
L(1− iT )
(1− iC)
di,
which yields
Y˜ ∗ =
iC − ı˜T
L
l˜∗
R iT
ı˜T
a(i)di+ 1− iC
. (26)
The solution to (25) and (26) is
l˜∗ = L∗
and
Y˜ ∗ =
L∗(iC − ı˜T )
L
R iT
ı˜T
a(i)di+ L∗(1− iC)
. (27)
Differentiating (27) at ı˜T = iT we get, using (11):
dY˜ ∗
dı˜T
=
µ
a(iT )
a(iC)
− 1
¶
1
1− iC
(28)
Again, dY˜ ∗/dı˜T < 0, reflecting the terms of trade improvements for the East
brought about by liberalization. Furthermore, this quantity is larger in absolute
value than that in (18), meaning that the East gets a higher improvement in its
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relative GDP than if labor were immobile there. That is not surprising, since
labor reallocation increases total GDP by eliminating cross-sectoral differences
in the marginal value product of labor.
It is also easy to check that the East as a whole gains, as do all workers there
whose wages are equalized. The consumer price level is
ln p˜∗ =
Z iC
0
ln(a(i)w˜∗)di+
Z 1
iC
(ln w˜(i))di
=
Z iC
0
ln(a(i)w˜∗)di+ (1− iC) ln
"
1 + Y˜ ∗
L 1−iT1−iC
#
di.
Using this formula and (23), we see that a marginal trade liberalization around
ı˜T ≈ iT has an effect on p˜∗c given by
d ln p˜∗
dı˜T
(˜ıT = iT ) =
dY˜ ∗
dı˜T
∙
1
Y ∗
iC +
1− iC
1 + Y ∗
¸
,
which is both negative and greater than d ln w˜
∗
dı˜T
= 1Y ∗
dY˜ ∗
dı˜T
. Consequently, d ln w˜
∗
dı˜T
−
d ln p˜∗
dı˜T
< 0. Liberalization unambiguously benefits the East’s consumers.13 Al-
though it is not obvious to compare aggregate gains for the East with those
computed in the previous section, one should clearly expect lower opposition to
liberalization than if labor in the East were immobile, as we have seen that all
producers of existing traded goods then lose. We again summarize the effects
on the East’s welfare with the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 5 — If labor is mobile in the East but not in the West, a
marginal ex-post liberalization unambiguously benefits all workers in the East.
Furthermore, its relative GDP increases by more than if labor were immobile in
the East.
We now turn to the West. We again have three groups of workers, A,B, and
C, as defined above. We start with group B, workers in the newly traded goods.
13One would like to compare these consumer’s gains to those they derive from ex-ante
liberalization, i.e. if labor were freely mobile in the West as well. Unfortunately, the formulas
suggest the comparison is ambiguous and yield no clear economic intuition for that.
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In these sectors, the wage in the West is equal to
w˜(i) = a(i)w˜∗.
If a(i) is close enough to one (as in the preceding numerical example), and
if liberalization is only marginal, w˜∗ will differ from w∗ only infinitesimally, and
w˜(i) will fall to the Eastern wage level: French hairdressers then indeed lose
two-thirds of their income. The inflow of Polish hairdressers, coming from other
occupations, pushes them down their marginal revenue schedule, up to the point
where they earn the Polish equilibrium wage. More precisely, their wage falls to
w˜(iT ) = a(iT )w˜
∗
≈ a(iT )w∗
=
a(iT )
La(iC)
, (29)
where equations (10) and (11) have been used. Clearly, the RHS of (29) is
smaller than that of (19).
Turning now to group C, their wage is equal to w˜(i) = Y˜ /l(i) = 1/L. It is
again constant in nominal terms, and their gains are again the same as for the
country as a whole. The price level is
ln p˜ =
Z ı˜T
0
ln
1
L
+
Z iC
ı˜T
ln(a(i)w˜∗) +
Z 1
iC
ln
(1 + Y˜ ∗)(1− iC)
L(1− iT )
.
which allows to compute the effect of marginal liberalization:
d ln p˜
dı˜T
= ln
a(iC)
a(iT )
+
dY˜ ∗
dı˜T
∙
(iC − iT )
Y ∗
+
1− iC
1 + Y ∗
¸
, (30)
where we have made use of w˜∗ = Y˜ ∗/L∗ and of w∗/w = w∗L = a(iC).
The first term is positive, reflecting the efficiency gains of trade reform; the
second term is negative, reflecting the effect of the terms of trade. If d ln pdı˜T > 0,
then both group C and the country as a whole gain from liberalization.
Substituting (28) we get
d ln p˜
dı˜T
= ln
a(iC)
a(iT )
+
µ
a(iT )
a(iC)
− 1
¶ ∙
1− iC
1− iT
+ 1
¸
.
28
This quantity may either be positive or negative, while d ln p˜dı˜T was always pos-
itive in the preceding subsection. Labor mobility in the East magnifies both the
efficiency effects and the terms-of-trade effects of liberalization, and makes it
possible that the latter dominates so that the country as a whole loses, which
was ruled out when labor could not move in either country.
Finally, what happens to group A? Differentiating (24) and subtracting (30),
and making use again of (28), we get
d ln w˜(i)
dı˜T
− d ln p˜
dı˜T
=
iC
1− iT
µ
a(iT )
a(iC)
− 1
¶
+ ln
a(iT )
a(iC)
+ 1− a(iT )
a(iC)
< 0.
Therefore, these workers unambiguously gain again. Furthermore, this
quantity is larger in absolute value than that in (21); gains are larger than
when labor in the East is immobile.
PROPOSITION 6 — If labor is mobile in the East but not in the West, upon
ex-post marginal liberalization:
(i) Group C and the economy as a whole may either gain or lose,
(ii) The wage of group B falls to the Eastern level; it loses by a discrete
amount, which is larger than if labor in the East were immobile.
(iii) Group A unambiguously gains, by an infinitesimal amount which is
larger than if labor in the East were immobile.
Hence the results are qualitatively similar to those of the previous section;
but the discrete wage fall of Western “hairdressers” is much larger, and the pro-
ducers of non traded goods (and the country as a whole) may now lose. The first
face an inflow of Eastern hairdressers which is larger than if labor reallocation
were impossible there. The second suffer from a stronger improvement in the
East’s terms of trade. On the other hand, producers of non traded goods gain
more, since they export to the East and benefit from its greater relative GDP.
This discussion suggests that the case studied here — labor immobility in
the West but not in the East — is the least favorable one for the West. At the
aggregate level, losses are more plausible than under ex-ante liberalization, and
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were ruled out if labor could not move in the East. At the disaggregate level,
it is the case where the gains from trade are most unevenly distributed in the
West, with producers of existing traded goods getting a greater share than in
the other two cases, and producers of newly traded goods experiencing a wage
drop down to the Eastern level.
9 Other extensions
I have extended the model in two directions, in an Appendix available from the
author upon request. First, the logarithmic utility function can be replaced by
a more general CES one. Second, the model can be made more in line with an
interpretation in terms of tradeable services, rather than tradeable goods, by
assuming that exporters have to spend part of their income consuming in the
other country.
The distributive effects highlighted above are basically robust to these ex-
tensions. However, some novel phenomena arise. For example, we show that
the greater the share of income exporters have to spend in the other country,
the lower the gains from liberalization to producers of non traded goods (groups
C and C∗) in both countries, and they may even lose.
10 Conclusion
Let us review our main findings and their implications:
1. There exists a terms-of-trade effect which favors the East. That is because
(by assumption) the goods where the West’s relative productivity is highest are
already traded, which is not the case for the East. In principle, that effect may
be strong enough to generate net losses from trade for the West even under
perfect mobility, although the formulas above suggest it is unlikely.
2. If labor is immobile ex-post, there will be a constituency against reform in
both countries. In the West, producers of the newly traded goods always lose.
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On the other hand, producers of non traded goods cannot lose, nor can the
country as a whole. In the East, producers of traded goods, who face a higher
price level at home, but can’t relocate to the high value new traded goods, lose
because the price of their own goods, which also reflects demand in the West,
rises by less than the domestic consumer price level. If liberalization is marginal,
few people lose a “large” amount in the West, while many people lose a “small
amount” in the East.
3. The political economy consequences of these observations clearly depend
on how different groups affect collective choices. If people simply vote, marginal
liberalization will actually be met by more opposition in the East than in the
West. But a number of alternative assumptions will yield the opposite conclu-
sion. That will be the case if voters disregard small losses, and if groups who
lose a large amount can organize to block the reform. It will also be true if, in
the fashion of Gersbach and Schniewind (2001), voters have a better perception
of direct effects of policy choices on their welfare, than of indirect effects. It is
far easier for producers of newly traded goods in the West to realize that they
lose than for producers of traded goods in the East to find out that the CPI will
rise by more than their own wage.
4. Because producers of traded goods in the West gain from liberalization,
the social groups who oppose a given reform will, once it is implemented, support
further reforms. Another way to put it is that they will lose less, or even gain,
if a broad range of goods, rather than a narrow one, becomes tradeable. While
losses are smaller under a broader reform, the number of losers is clearly larger.
Hence whether a broad reform is more politically viable than a narrow one
depends on whether it is large groups, or small groups of agents with a strong
motivation, that are most efficient in blocking a reform.
5. If labor is immobile in theWest but not in the East, then workers there will
all support liberalization, as they benefit both from a more efficient allocation
of production and from an improvement in the terms of trade. As for the West,
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gains and losses are more unevenly distributed as compared to the case where
labor is immobile in both countries. Producers of the newly traded goods lose
much more, producers of traded goods gain more, and the country as a whole
and producers of non traded goods may now lose. This is the configuration
which is likely to generate the fiercest opposition from the West. In my view,
this result sheds light on the casual observation that the EU countries that
opposed the service directive, e.g. France, have a high level of labor market
regulation, while the relatively deregulated countries, e.g. the UK, support the
directive.
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APPENDIX — Proof of Proposition 4
A first result that can be established is that the producers with the lowest
comparative advantage (i = ı˜T ) always experience a discrete wage loss. To see
this, note that their wage changes from w = 1/L to w˜(i) = 1+Y˜
∗
L+L∗/a(ı˜T )
. Using
(17), we see that w˜(i) < w if and only if
L(1− ı˜T ) < (L+ L∗/a(˜ıT ))(1− iC + L
Z iT
ı˜T
1
L+ L∗/a(i)
di). (31)
Since
R iT
ı˜T
1
L+L∗/a(i)di >
iT−ı˜T
L+L∗/a(ı˜T )
, a sufficient condition for (31) to hold is
LiT +
L∗
a(ı˜T )
(1 − iC) − LiC > 0. Using (11) to eliminate iC , it is easy to check
that this sufficient condition holds.
A second result is that conditional on being liberalized, producers of any good
i prefer full liberalization (˜ıT = 0) to take place. To see this, note again that
their nominal wage is
w˜(i) =
1 + Y˜ ∗
L+ L∗/a(i)
.
It has to be deflated by the consumer price index, which can again be computed
using the formulas for wages at the beginning of this section:
ln p˜ =
Z ı˜T
0
ln
1
L
dj +
Z iT
ı˜T
ln
1 + Y˜ ∗
L+ L∗/a(j)
dj
+
Z iC
ıT
ln
⎡
⎣a(j)
³
1 + Y˜ ∗
´
(iC − iT )
L∗(1− iT )
⎤
⎦ dj
+
Z 1
ıC
ln
³
1 + Y˜ ∗
´
(1− iC)
L(1− iT )
dj.
Subtracting, we get
ln w˜(i)− ln p˜ = ı˜T
∙
ln(1 + Y˜ ∗)− ln 1
L
¸
+
Z iT
ı˜T
ln (L+ L∗/a(j)) dj
+K(i),
where all the terms that do not depend on the degree of liberalization ı˜T have
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been lumped in the constant K(i). Differentiating with respect to ı˜T , we get
d
dı˜T
(ln w˜(i)− ln p˜) = ı˜T
dY˜ ∗/dı˜T
1 + Y˜ ∗
+ ln
L(1 + Y˜ ∗)
(L+ L∗/a(˜ıT ))
. (32)
The last term is negative, as it is equal to the log wage change of workers
in the ı˜T sector. Furthermore, by differentiating the RHS of (17)14 , we can also
prove that dY˜ ∗/dı˜T < 0, that is, the terms of trade improve more in favor of
the East, the wider the liberalization. Hence the first term in the RHS of (32)
is also negative; further liberalizations unambiguously increase the welfare of
workers already exposed to reform. They can buy formerly nontraded goods at
a lower price and sell at a higher price to richer customers in the East.
Finally, can there be some workers who strictly gain from the reform, despite
being themselves exposed? To answer that question, let us look at the most
favorable case, i.e. that of full liberalization with ı˜T = 0. Using (17) and (16)
we find that workers in sector i experience a positive wage jump if and only if:
(L+ L∗/a(i))
Z iT
0
1
L+ L∗/a(j)
dj + (iC − iT )
a(iC)
a(i)
≤ iC . (33)
14The derivative has the same sign as
N = −(1− iC)
L∗/a(˜ıT )
L+ L∗/a(˜ıT )
− L
Z iT
ı˜T
1
L+ L∗/a(i)
di
+(iC − ı˜T )
L
L+ L∗/a(˜ıT )
= −(1− iC)
L∗/a(˜ıT )
L+ L∗/a(˜ıT )
+ (iC − iT )
L
L+ L∗/a(˜ıT )
+(iT − ı˜T )
L
L+ L∗/a(˜ıT )
− L
Z iT
ı˜T
1
L+ L∗/a(i)
di.
Using (11), we can rewrite that as
N = − (1− iC)L
∗
L+ L∗/a(˜ıT )
∙
1
a(˜ıT )
− 1
a(iC)
¸
−L
"Z iT
ı˜T
µ
1
L+ L∗/a(i)
− 1
L+ L∗/a(˜ıT )
¶
di
#
.
The two quantities in brackets are clearly positive, hence N < 0.
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Not surprisingly, that is more likely to hold, the greater the worker’s compar-
ative advantage i, and we have already seen that it cannot hold for i = ı˜T = 0.
Inspection of that formula also reveals that the exposed worker with the best
comparative advantage, i = iT , may either gain or lose. It gains if a(iT ) is close
to a(iC) but a(i) is small relative to a(iT ) for most values of i < iT . In such a
case, exposed workers gain if i is greater than some critical value. Otherwise,
all exposed workers lose.
To summarize this subsection findings:
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